Sequential path independence and social choice
From MaRDI portal
Publication:919959
DOI10.1007/BF01395722zbMath0707.90009OpenAlexW2064946205MaRDI QIDQ919959
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01395722
Related Items (4)
Path independence in serial-parallel data processing ⋮ Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence ⋮ Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions ⋮ Revealed preference and the axiomatic foundations of intransitive indifference: The case of asymmetric subrelations
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
- Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
- Weak path independence
- Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
- Rationality, path independence, and the power structure
- Revealed Preference Theory, Ordering and the Axiom of Sequential Path Independence
- Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
- Some Further Results on Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
- Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
- Ordinal Preference and Rational Choice
- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
This page was built for publication: Sequential path independence and social choice