Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2365784
DOI10.1007/BF00183344zbMATH Open0779.90006OpenAlexW2055053954MaRDI QIDQ2365784FDOQ2365784
Authors: Jerry S. Kelly 
Publication date: 29 June 1993
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00183344
Recommendations
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
- On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules
- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
- Weakly implementable social choice rules
- Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
Cited In (32)
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
- Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
- Iterative voting with partial preferences
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
- Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
- Strategic voting and nomination
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
- The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
- Defending against strategic manipulation in uninorm-based multi-agent decision making
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
- On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
- Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- On the individual and coalitional manipulability of \(q\)-Paretian social choice rules
- A quantitative Gobbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
- The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
- Interjacency
- Dictatorship versus manipulability
- A correspondence between voting procedures and stochastic orderings
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
This page was built for publication: Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2365784)
