Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
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Publication:2365784
DOI10.1007/BF00183344zbMath0779.90006MaRDI QIDQ2365784
Publication date: 29 June 1993
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B14: Social choice
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