Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't

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(32)

Strategic voting and nomination
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Dictatorship versus manipulability
Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
A correspondence between voting procedures and stochastic orderings
A quantitative Gobbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
Interjacency
The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
Iterative voting with partial preferences
Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
On the individual and coalitional manipulability of \(q\)-Paretian social choice rules
The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
Defending against strategic manipulation in uninorm-based multi-agent decision making
Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules
Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules
On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules

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