Jerry S. Kelly

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List of research outcomes

PublicationDate of PublicationType
Kenneth J. Arrow2022-01-05Paper
Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence2021-04-26Paper
Balancedness of social choice correspondences2019-11-08Paper
A stability property in social choice theory2018-09-04Paper
Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population2018-08-29Paper
Range results for some social choice correspondences2017-12-27Paper
The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences2017-06-09Paper
Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences2016-12-01Paper
A conjecture on the construction of orderings by Borda's rule2016-07-06Paper
Social choice trade-off results for conditions on triples of alternatives2015-12-22Paper
Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain2015-09-29Paper
A Class of Orderings in the Range of Borda's Rule2015-07-13Paper
Strategy-proofness on the Non-Paretian Subdomain2015-02-25Paper
Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization2014-09-04Paper
Two Theorems on the Range of Strategy-proof Rules on a Restricted Domain2014-08-29Paper
Breadth of loss due to manipulation2014-04-24Paper
Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda2014-04-08Paper
Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power2013-09-20Paper
Uniformly bounded sufficient sets and quasitransitive social choice2013-02-26Paper
Social choice rules with vetoers2013-01-01Paper
There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think2012-11-08Paper
Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda2011-04-29Paper
Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules2010-11-22Paper
Strategy-proofness and weighted voting2010-09-07Paper
Gains from manipulating social choice rules2009-07-24Paper
Uniformly bounded information and social choice2009-07-01Paper
https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/entity/Q36266802009-05-22Paper
Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives2007-11-14Paper
Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives2007-11-14Paper
Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation2006-05-18Paper
Correction to: `Information and preference aggregation'2005-12-09Paper
On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems2005-10-19Paper
Non-monotonicity does not imply the no-show paradox2005-10-14Paper
Information and preference aggregation2005-09-20Paper
Migration disequilibrium and specific division rules2005-08-22Paper
Incompatibility of strategy-proofness and the Condorcet principle2005-08-22Paper
A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule2003-10-16Paper
A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures2003-01-26Paper
Weak independence and veto power.2002-07-24Paper
Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?2002-01-01Paper
A trade-off result for preference revelation2000-08-14Paper
A simple characterization of majority rule2000-07-09Paper
https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/entity/Q43858551998-09-20Paper
Quasitransitive social preference: Why some very large coalitions have very little power1998-08-10Paper
Asymptotic density and social choice trade-offs1998-01-26Paper
Super Arrovian Domains with Strict Preferences1997-12-01Paper
Relaxing Pareto optimality in economic environments1997-07-23Paper
Social choice trade-offs for an arbitrary measure:1997-02-28Paper
Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences1997-02-13Paper
Independent social choice correspondences1996-12-16Paper
Division rules and migration equilibria1996-12-09Paper
Continuous-valued social choice1996-01-01Paper
Lebesgue measure and social choice trade-offs1995-07-13Paper
Nondictatorially independent pairs1995-05-15Paper
The Bordes-LeBreton exceptional case1994-08-18Paper
The free triple assumption1994-05-05Paper
t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off1994-03-27Paper
Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't1993-06-29Paper
Abelian symmetry groups in social choice1993-06-29Paper
https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/entity/Q40403201993-06-05Paper
Craven's conjecture1992-06-26Paper
Symmetry groups1991-01-01Paper
Impossibility results with resoluteness1990-01-01Paper
Dictionaries1989-01-01Paper
Interjacency1989-01-01Paper
The Ostrogorski paradox1989-01-01Paper
A new informational base for social choice1989-01-01Paper
Social choice and computational complexity1988-01-01Paper
An efficient algorithm for voting sequences1987-01-01Paper
Simple majority voting isn't special1984-01-01Paper
The Sertel and van der Bellen problems1984-01-01Paper
Externalities and the possibility of Pareto-satisfactory decentralization1983-01-01Paper
https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/entity/Q39123031978-01-01Paper
Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness1977-01-01Paper
Impossibility theorems without collective rationality1976-01-01Paper
Rights exercising and a Pareto-consistent libertarian claim1976-01-01Paper
Algebraic results on collective choice rules1976-01-01Paper
Linear Cross-Equation Constraints and the Identification Problem1975-01-01Paper
Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives1974-01-01Paper
The Continuous Representation of a Social Preference Ordering1971-01-01Paper
The Identification of Ratios of Parameters in Unidentified Equations1971-01-01Paper

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