Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization
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Publication:404767
DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0790-7zbMATH Open1297.91061OpenAlexW1966297040MaRDI QIDQ404767FDOQ404767
Cites Work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3479762 (Why is no real title available?)
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