Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization
From MaRDI portal
Publication:404767
DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0790-7zbMATH Open1297.91061OpenAlexW1966297040MaRDI QIDQ404767FDOQ404767
Authors: Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly 
Publication date: 4 September 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0790-7
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-optimality
- Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle
- A note on social choice theory without the Pareto principle
- t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off
- Collective Choice Rules without the Pareto Principle
- Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle
- Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle
- Coalitional power structure without the Pareto principle
- Wilson's theorem for economic environments and continuous social preferences
- Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: a survey and open questions
- Nondictatorially independent pairs and Pareto
- On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems
- Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
- Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting
- Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules
- Impossibility results with resoluteness
- The NIP graph of a social welfare function
- A topological approach to Wilson's impossibility theorem
- Wilson's theorem for consensus functions on hierarchies
- Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
Cited In (3)
This page was built for publication: Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q404767)
