Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules

DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0492-7MaRDI QIDQ607476zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date 22 November 2010

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0492-7

zbMATH Keywords

gainslossesmanipulationssocial choice rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Breadth of loss due to manipulation
• Robustness against inefficient manipulation
• Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't

Cites work

• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization

Cited in

(5)

• The intellectual influence of economic journals: quality versus quantity
• On the universally beneficial manipulation conjecture
• Breadth of loss due to manipulation
• Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization
• Social Choice Theory

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