Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0106-2zbMath1098.91032OpenAlexW2063680475MaRDI QIDQ2432505

Pierre Favardin, Dominique Lepelley

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0106-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models, The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner, Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation, IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report, Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules, Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey, On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory, On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives, Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules, Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules, Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis, Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules, Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs, Strategic voting and nomination, One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness, On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions, Statistical evaluation of voting rules

Cites Work

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