On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of 4 and 5 alternatives

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.10.001MaRDI QIDQ449050zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel Karabekyan, M. Remzi Sanver, Vyacheslav Yakuba, Fuad T. Aleskerov

Publication date 11 September 2012

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.001

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
• A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Arrovian aggregation models
• Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
• On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
• Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
• The threshold aggregation

Cited in

(11)

• The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions
• A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity
• How Often Are You Decisive: an Enquiry About the Pivotality of Voting Rules
• Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
• Comparing the Manipulability of Approval Voting and Borda
• Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
• Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
• Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
• On the individual and coalitional manipulability of \(q\)-Paretian social choice rules
• Dictatorship versus manipulability
• Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules

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