On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of 4 and 5 alternatives
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Publication:449050
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.10.001zbMATH Open1246.91040OpenAlexW1991455176MaRDI QIDQ449050FDOQ449050
Authors: Daniel Karabekyan, M. Remzi Sanver, Vyacheslav Yakuba, Fuad T. Aleskerov 
Publication date: 11 September 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.001
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Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Arrovian aggregation models
- Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
- On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
- The threshold aggregation
Cited In (11)
- A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity
- The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions
- How Often Are You Decisive: an Enquiry About the Pivotality of Voting Rules
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
- Comparing the Manipulability of Approval Voting and Borda
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
- Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
- On the individual and coalitional manipulability of \(q\)-Paretian social choice rules
- Dictatorship versus manipulability
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
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