On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
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Publication:449050
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.001zbMath1246.91040OpenAlexW1991455176MaRDI QIDQ449050
M. Remzi Sanver, Vyacheslav Yakuba, Daniel Karabekyan, Fuad T. Aleskerov
Publication date: 11 September 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.001
Related Items (8)
The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions ⋮ Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation ⋮ Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings ⋮ Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules ⋮ Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules ⋮ Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information ⋮ A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity ⋮ Dictatorship versus manipulability
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