On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of 4 and 5 alternatives
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:449050)
On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
Recommendations
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
- Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
Cites work
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Arrovian aggregation models
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
- On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
- Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
- The threshold aggregation
Cited in
(11)- Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
- A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity
- Dictatorship versus manipulability
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
- How Often Are You Decisive: an Enquiry About the Pivotality of Voting Rules
- Comparing the Manipulability of Approval Voting and Borda
- On the individual and coalitional manipulability of \(q\)-Paretian social choice rules
- The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions
This page was built for publication: On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q449050)
