scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103
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Publication:4495209
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(36)- Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
- Manipulability of choice aggregations
- On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
- Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
- On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules
- Manipulability in school choice
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
- Strategic voting and nomination
- Dominating, weakly stable, and uncovered sets: properties and generalizations
- Weighted committee games
- Dictatorship versus manipulability
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules
- Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
- Statistical evaluation of voting rules
- On the safety of group manipulation
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
- On the individual and coalitional manipulability of \(q\)-Paretian social choice rules
- Instant runoff voting and the reinforcement paradox
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
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