On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules

DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00258-3zbMath1492.91122OpenAlexW3194514862MaRDI QIDQ2128950

Attila Tasnádi, Dezső Bednay, Sonal Yadav

Publication date: 22 April 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00258-3

zbMATH Keywords

manipulabilityvoting rulesmulti winner voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Does avoiding bad voting rules result in good ones?
• Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
• Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
• The Impartial, Anonymous, and Neutral Culture Model: A Probability Model for Sampling Public Preference Structures
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Voting in Combinatorial Domains

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