On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules (Q2128950)

This paper studies the selection of the kth-ranked alternative in the social ranking according to the number of first-place positions in the individual ranking. These social choice functions are in it defined as plurality kth rules. Individual and group manipulability of the plurality kth rules are investigated. It is shown that, regarding individual manipulability, the proportion of manipulable profiles increases in k. It is also demonstrated that, with the exception of the plurality rule, all other plurality kth rules are group manipulable, i.e. coordinated misrepresentation of individual rankings is advantageous for each group member with an appropriately chosen tie-breaking rule on the set of all profiles. The plurality kth rules are arranged based on the proportion of manipulable profiles. A new domain that is maximal with respect to non-manipulability is provided. A decomposition of social choice functions based on plurality kth rules is proposed and applied for determining non-manipulable subdomains for arbitrary social choice functions. Connections between plurality kth rules and single non-transferable vote rules are established.