Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count (Q2580968)

The central results of the social choice theory are the impossibility theorems of Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite which have led to a steady search for possibility results on restricted domains. The usual approach is to fix an appropriate set of addmissible preferences and to investigate which social welfare functions satisfy Arrow's conditions, resprectively which social choice functions are non-manipulable, on what preference domain. The paper follows a different approach developed by Dasgupta and Maskin. In contrast to Dasgupta and Maskin it is imposed the original independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, not their stronger neutrally condition. It is considered the question on which the Borda count is strategy proof. It is shown by example that there exist rich domains on which the Borda count violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition but is nevertheless strategy-proof when combined with some suitable tie-breaking rule. The conclusion from the results of the paper is that the Borda count fares poorly in terms of strategic manipulation, in the sense that there are very few non-manipulable domains all of which are very small.