Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.02.002MaRDI QIDQ997202zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefan Maus, Ton Storcken, Hans Peters

Publication date 23 July 2007

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

anonymityminimal manipulabilitysocial choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
• Interjacency
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
• Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
• Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
• On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility

Cited in

(14)

• Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
• Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
• On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules
• Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions
• Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
• Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
• Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions
• Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
• Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
• The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• Dictatorship versus manipulability
• Nonmanipulability in two dimensions

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