Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
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Publication:997202
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.02.002zbMATH Open1283.91058OpenAlexW2084564739MaRDI QIDQ997202FDOQ997202
Authors: Stefan Maus, Ton Storcken, Hans Peters 
Publication date: 23 July 2007
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.02.002
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- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
- Interjacency
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
Cited In (14)
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules
- Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
- Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
- Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions
- Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
- The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules
- Dictatorship versus manipulability
- Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
- Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
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