Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
From MaRDI portal
Continuous, anonymous, strategyproof social choice functions for two- dimensional alternative set and preferences given by utility functions - d(x,a) are proved to be generalized median functions coordinatewise in some coordinate system. In three or more dimensions efficiency is not possible.
Recommendations
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
- Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- Generalized median social welfare functions
- Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3831617 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3211481 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3235051 (Why is no real title available?)
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox
- Properties of consistent voting systems
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
Cited in
(18)- Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
- Generalized median social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
- Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
- Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms
- Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes
- The publications of Ki Hang Kim
- Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?
- Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions
- Constant-approximate and constant-strategyproof two-facility location
- Spatial implementation
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
This page was built for publication: Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q802458)
