Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0181-4zbMath1180.91117MaRDI QIDQ2642552

Kari Saukkonen

Publication date: 17 August 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0181-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Quasi-stationary social welfare functions, Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population

Cites Work

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