Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents

DOI10.3982/TE5105MaRDI QIDQ6076915zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 17 October 2023

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te5105

zbMATH Keywords

college admissionsmanipulabilitymarket designschool choicetwo-sided matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
• Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
• Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
• Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
• Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
• Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets
• Incentive compatibility of large centralized matching markets
• Competition and cooperation in a two-sided matching market with replication
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets

Cites work

• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
• Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
• Constrained school choice
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
• Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Manipulability in school choice
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Manipulation via capacities revisited
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The modified Boston mechanism

Cited in

(6)

• Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students
• Robustness to manipulations in school choice
• A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation
• When do reforms meet fairness concerns in school admissions?
• The manipulability of the deferred acceptance mechanism without outside options
• Coalitional manipulability in school choice

This page was built for publication: Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6076915)