Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
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Publication:1338121
DOI10.1007/BF01210572zbMATH Open0808.90009OpenAlexW1974769140MaRDI QIDQ1338121FDOQ1338121
John H. Vande Vate, Alvin E. Roth
Publication date: 27 November 1994
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01210572
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Non-cooperative matching games
Cited In (31)
- Reward maximization in general dynamic matching systems
- Marriage matching and gender satisfaction
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
- Optimal truncation in matching markets
- Two-sided matching with spatially differentiated agents
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
- On randomized matching mechanisms
- Protective behavior in matching models
- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- Random matching in the college admissions problem
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
- Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
- Obvious manipulations
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Sticky matching in school choice
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
- Dynamically stable matching
- A Bayesian framework for modelling the preferential selection process in respondent-driven sampling
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
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