Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
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Publication:2164331
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2022.102720zbMATH Open1497.91156OpenAlexW4281571485MaRDI QIDQ2164331FDOQ2164331
Authors: Ayşe Yazıcı 
Publication date: 12 August 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102720
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Large matching markets as two-sided demand systems
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- Bargaining and efficiency in networks
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- Decentralized job matching
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- Efficient partnership formation in networks
Cited In (9)
- The strategic decentralization of recruiting
- Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets
- Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- Decentralized job matching
- Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
- Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries
- Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core
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