Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2022.102720zbMATH Open1497.91156OpenAlexW4281571485MaRDI QIDQ2164331FDOQ2164331

Ayşe Yazıcı

Publication date: 12 August 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102720

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityrandom matchingsenior-level markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Large Matching Markets as Two-Sided Demand Systems
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• Bargaining and efficiency in networks
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
• Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
• Decentralized job matching
• Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
• Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
• Efficient partnership formation in networks

Cited In (2)

• The strategic decentralization of recruiting
• Welfare and stability in senior matching markets

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