Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2022.102720MaRDI QIDQ2164331zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ayşe Yazıcı

Publication date 12 August 2022

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102720

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityrandom matchingsenior-level markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68) Labor markets (91B39)

Recommendations

• Decentralized job matching
• Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
• Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
• Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries
• Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bargaining and efficiency in networks
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Decentralized job matching
• Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
• Efficient partnership formation in networks
• Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
• Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
• Large matching markets as two-sided demand systems
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
• Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets

Cited in

(9)

• Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
• Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
• The strategic decentralization of recruiting
• Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries
• Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core
• Decentralized job matching
• Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
• Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets
• Welfare and stability in senior matching markets

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