Recommendations
Cites work
- A course in game theory.
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
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- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
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- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
Cited in
(27)- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
- Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
- One-to-many non-cooperative matching games
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- Multi-agent reinforcement learning for decentralized stable matching
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Referral-based Job Search Networks
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7626775 (Why is no real title available?)
- The inefficiency of Nash and subgame perfect equilibria for network routing
- Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
- The strategic decentralization of recruiting
- Tâtonnement in matching markets
- An experimental study of decentralized matching
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
- Dynamic matching games: stationary equilibria under varying commitments
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
- Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries
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