Decentralized job matching
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Publication:532508
DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0218-XzbMATH Open1216.91017OpenAlexW2108738437MaRDI QIDQ532508FDOQ532508
Authors: Guillaume Haeringer, Myrna Wooders 
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269572/files/twerp688.pdf
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Cites Work
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- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
Cited In (21)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- Referral-based Job Search Networks
- The strategic decentralization of recruiting
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
- Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
- One-to-many non-cooperative matching games
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
- Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries
- The Inefficiency of Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria for Network Routing
- Multi-agent reinforcement learning for decentralized stable matching
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
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