Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries
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Publication:952773
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.01.005zbMATH Open1152.91679OpenAlexW2040346493MaRDI QIDQ952773FDOQ952773
Authors: Hideo Konishi, Margarita Sapozhnikov 
Publication date: 14 November 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp654.pdf
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Cites Work
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Cited In (7)
- Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
- Competition in a posted-salary matching market under private information
- Price formation in a matching market with targeted offers
- Decentralized job matching
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
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