Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
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Publication:485820
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.005zbMath1302.91157OpenAlexW3121615548MaRDI QIDQ485820
Matteo Triossi, Antonio Romero-Medina
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.cea-uchile.cl/wp-content/uploads/doctrab/ASOCFILE120100922115327.pdf
Related Items (7)
Decentralized college admissions under single application ⋮ Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching ⋮ The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria ⋮ Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
Cites Work
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- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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