Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.005zbMath1302.91157OpenAlexW3121615548MaRDI QIDQ485820

Matteo Triossi, Antonio Romero-Medina

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.cea-uchile.cl/wp-content/uploads/doctrab/ASOCFILE120100922115327.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

irreversibilitymultiple applicationssequential mechanismsstable outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (7)

Decentralized college admissions under single application ⋮ Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching ⋮ The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria ⋮ Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm

Cites Work

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• Decentralized job matching
• Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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