Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.08.005MaRDI QIDQ485820zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antonio Romero-Medina, Matteo Triossi

Publication date 14 January 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.cea-uchile.cl/wp-content/uploads/doctrab/ASOCFILE120100922115327.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

irreversibilitymultiple applicationssequential mechanismsstable outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Decentralized job matching
• Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
• Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems

Cited in

(13)

• Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability
• Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
• Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
• Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
• Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
• The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
• Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
• Non-vetoed matching with status quo
• Sequential school choice with public and private schools
• Game-theoretic analysis of decentralized college admissions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
• Decentralized college admissions under single application

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