Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
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Recommendations
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
- Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
Cited in
(6)- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
- Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
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