Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2013343
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.04.001zbMATH Open1393.91121OpenAlexW2402479472MaRDI QIDQ2013343FDOQ2013343
Authors: Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn 
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hec.unil.ch/attachments/deep/series/2016/16.07.pdf
Recommendations
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
Cited In (6)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
This page was built for publication: Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2013343)
