Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Random matching in the college admissions problem
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
Cited in
(12)- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
- On non‐bossy matching rules in two‐sided matching problems
- Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
- Commitment under uncertainty: Two-stage stochastic matching problems
- Stabilizing policies for probabilistic matching systems
- Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
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