Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.

DOI10.1007/S100580200063zbMATH Open1055.91003OpenAlexW1502787658MaRDI QIDQ1811235FDOQ1811235

Authors: Jinpeng Ma 

Publication date: 2002

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1247.pdf

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• The College Admissions Problem Revisited

zbMATH Keywords

matchingNash equilibriumcollege admission problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Noncooperative games (91A10) Matching models (91B68)

Cited In (19)

• A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
• A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
• The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
• Random matching in the college admissions problem
• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Implementation of the core in college admissions problems when colleagues matter
• Matching markets under (in)complete information
• Dynamics in tree formation games
• Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
• Two-Sided Matching Models
• Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
• Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems
• Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
• A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
• Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
• Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
• A further note on the college admission game

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