A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion

DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0083-4MaRDI QIDQ2482673zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nitsan Perach, Julia Polak, Uriel G. Rothblum

Publication date 23 April 2008

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0083-4

zbMATH Keywords

Case studyQuasi stable outcomesTwo-criteria decision-making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Kidney Exchange
• Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets

Cited in

(18)

• Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
• Handling preferences in student-project allocation
• Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
• Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list
• Computational complexity of \(k\)-stable matchings
• Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
• A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
• Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
• Optimal matching of approvers to access requests
• Dorm augmented college assignments
• Student admissions and faculty recruitment
• Pareto optimality in many-to-many matching problems
• Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list
• College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
• The stability of marriage and university admissions—zero-one programming method
• Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
• The stable marriage problem with master preference lists
• Matching and scheduling of student-company-talks for a university it-speed dating event

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