A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
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Publication:2482673
DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0083-4zbMath1143.91042OpenAlexW2051306036MaRDI QIDQ2482673
Uriel G. Rothblum, Julia Polak, Nitsan Perach
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0083-4
Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (13)
Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories ⋮ Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences ⋮ Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list ⋮ Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list ⋮ Handling preferences in student-project allocation ⋮ Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion ⋮ College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized ⋮ Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion ⋮ New and simple algorithms for stable flow problems ⋮ Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare ⋮ The stable marriage problem with master preference lists ⋮ A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences ⋮ Pareto optimality in many-to-many matching problems
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