A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
The paper represents a case study of two-criteria decision-making problem of assignment of students to dormitories with respect to their personal socio-economic characteristics (influencing the choice of the set of accepted applicants), and to their academic seniority and excelence (influencing actual assignment to particular dormitories). A modification of the usual stable matching model is developed and analyzed, and a new concept of quasi-stable outcomes is introduced. The case study results in an algorithm respecting the desirable properties of the result and general principles formulated in it.
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- A maximum stable matching for the roommates problem
- When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
- Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models
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- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- Matching and scheduling of student-company-talks for a university it-speed dating event
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- The stability of marriage and university admissions—zero-one programming method
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1305096 (Why is no real title available?)
- Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
- Optimal matching of approvers to access requests
- Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
- Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list
- Computational complexity of \(k\)-stable matchings
- Dorm augmented college assignments
- A comparative study of waitlist mechanisms: deferral versus pay-per-offer
- Maximum-utility popular matchings with bounded instability
- Popular roommates in simply exponential time
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