A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0083-4zbMATH Open1143.91042OpenAlexW2051306036MaRDI QIDQ2482673FDOQ2482673
Authors: Nitsan Perach, Julia Polak, Uriel G. Rothblum 
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0083-4
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Cites Work
Cited In (19)
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- Handling preferences in student-project allocation
- Dorm augmented college assignments
- The stable marriage problem with master preference lists
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
- Optimal matching of approvers to access requests
- Pareto optimality in many-to-many matching problems
- New and simple algorithms for stable flow problems
- Student admissions and faculty recruitment
- Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
- Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- Matching and scheduling of student-company-talks for a university it-speed dating event
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list
- Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
- Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
- A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list
- Computational complexity of \(k\)-stable matchings
- The stability of marriage and university admissions—zero-one programming method
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