The stable marriage problem with master preference lists
DOI10.1016/J.DAM.2008.01.002zbMATH Open1175.05111OpenAlexW2028966815MaRDI QIDQ1005239FDOQ1005239
Authors: Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove, Sandy Scott 
Publication date: 9 March 2009
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2008.01.002
Recommendations
NP-hardstable matchingstrongly stableweakly stablemaster list including tiesmaster preference liststrictly ordered master listsuper-stable
Graph algorithms (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C85) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70)
Cites Work
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Cited In (26)
- Stable marriage and indifference
- The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- Solving hard stable matching problems involving groups of similar agents
- Bribery and control in stable marriage
- Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem
- Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents
- Maximum stable matching with one-sided ties of bounded length
- Maximum locally stable matchings
- Hedonic diversity games: a complexity picture with more than two colors
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
- Stable Matchings with Ties, Master Preference Lists, and Matroid Constraints
- Stable matchings of teachers to schools
- The Price of Matching with Metric Preferences
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list
- Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core
- Popular matchings with variable item copies
- Compact Preference Representation in Stable Marriage Problems
- Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
- Stable marriage with groups of similar agents
- Geometric stable roommates
- A Matroid Generalization of the Super-Stable Matching Problem
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list
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