The stable marriage problem with master preference lists
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Publication:1005239
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Cites work
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Cited in
(29)- Hedonic diversity games: a complexity picture with more than two colors
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- The price of matching with metric preferences
- Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list
- Stable marriage and indifference
- Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
- Popular matchings with variable item copies
- Bribery and control in stable marriage
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- Maximum stable matching with one-sided ties of bounded length
- Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem
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- A matroid generalization of the super-stable matching problem
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- Stable marriage with groups of similar agents
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- A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list
- Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core
- Stable matchings of teachers to schools
- The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas
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- Bribery and control in stable marriage
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- Multidimensional stable roommates with master list
- Compact Preference Representation in Stable Marriage Problems
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