Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list
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Publication:6091175
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-27051-2_27arXiv2212.03521MaRDI QIDQ6091175
Publication date: 24 November 2023
Published in: WALCOM: Algorithms and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.03521
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