The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally Ranked Pairs
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Publication:3574308
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(18)- Finding and Recognizing Popular Coalition Structures
- How hard is it to satisfy (almost) all roommates?
- Improving solution times for stable matching problems through preprocessing
- Local matching dynamics in social networks
- Paths to stable allocations
- Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- Friend of my friend: network formation with two-hop benefit
- When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review
- Stable matching with network externalities
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list
- Egalitarian roommate allocations: complexity and stability
- Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem
- The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs
- A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
- Geometric stable roommates
- Mathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list
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