The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs
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Publication:2424240
DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0651-9zbMath1411.91423OpenAlexW2902431005MaRDI QIDQ2424240
Flip Klijn, Paula Jaramillo, Çağatay Kayı
Publication date: 24 June 2019
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/201962
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