The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs

DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0651-9zbMath1411.91423OpenAlexW2902431005MaRDI QIDQ2424240

Flip Klijn, Paula Jaramillo, Çağatay Kayı

Publication date: 24 June 2019

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/201962

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingcoreboundroommate problemrank gaprank-fairness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core ⋮ Preference aggregation for couples

Cites Work

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• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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