Random paths to stability in the roommate problem

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.05.003zbMath1093.91046OpenAlexW2142604667MaRDI QIDQ705942

Licun Xue, Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Eiichi Miyagawa

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.05.003

zbMATH Keywords

marriage problemCycleCore convergenceIndirect dominationOdd ring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (42)

Maintaining Near-Popular Matchings ⋮ Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries ⋮ A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks ⋮ Paths to stability for matching markets with couples ⋮ Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance ⋮ A local interaction dynamic for the matching problem ⋮ Analysis of stochastic matching markets ⋮ Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints ⋮ Farsighted house allocation ⋮ Stochastic stability for roommate markets ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games ⋮ A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems ⋮ The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs ⋮ Paths to stability for overlapping group structures ⋮ Stochastic stability in assignment problems ⋮ Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents ⋮ Locally Stable Marriage with Strict Preferences ⋮ Paths to stability in the assignment problem ⋮ Absorbing sets in roommate problems ⋮ Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints ⋮ Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem ⋮ Solutions for the stable roommates problem with payments ⋮ Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets ⋮ Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty ⋮ Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration ⋮ The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems ⋮ Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem ⋮ Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market ⋮ Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians ⋮ The roommate problem with externalities ⋮ The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games ⋮ A bargaining set for roommate problems ⋮ The strategy structure of some coalition formation games ⋮ Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab ⋮ On the accessibility of core-extensions ⋮ On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal matchings ⋮ Paths to stable allocations ⋮ Pairwise kidney exchange

Cites Work

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• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
• On randomized matching mechanisms
• On cores and indivisibility
• The evolution of social and economic networks.
• A property of the core
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
• Recontracting Stability
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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