Recommendations
- Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods
- Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
- The farsighted stable set
- (Sophisticated) stable sets in exchange economies
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784404 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Kidney Exchange
- On cores and indivisibility
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(5)- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
- Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability
- Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods
- Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
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