Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability
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Publication:2347998
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.02.002zbMath1319.91081MaRDI QIDQ2347998
Publication date: 10 June 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.02.002
91A12: Cooperative games
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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