Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.02.002zbMath1319.91081MaRDI QIDQ2347998

Ryo Kawasaki

Publication date: 10 June 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

market with indivisibilities; RP-stable allocations; VNM-stable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

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Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities, The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?

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