Reexamination of the international export quota game through the theory of social situations
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Publication:1294108
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0677zbMath0926.91032MaRDI QIDQ1294108
Publication date: 11 November 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275228
export quota game; international tade; quota retaliation; social situation; stable standard of behavior
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Cites Work