Pareto optimality and optimistic stability in repeated extensive form games

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0064MaRDI QIDQ1919072zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steven Tadelis

Publication date 22 January 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0064

zbMATH Keywords

abstract stable setsoptimistic stable standards of behavoirrepeated extensive from games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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