Markovian assignment rules

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0566-xzbMath1287.91099OpenAlexW2087221347MaRDI QIDQ2452135

David Cantala, Francis Bloch

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0566-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (8)

The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home? ⋮ A dynamic school choice model ⋮ Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents ⋮ A computational approach to the multi-period many-to-one matching with ties ⋮ On the operation of multiple matching markets ⋮ Influencing waiting lists ⋮ Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade

Cites Work

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• Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• Filling a multicolor urn: An axiomatic analysis.
• Control aspects in proportionality Markov manpower systems
• House allocation with existing tenants
• The theory and practice of revenue management
• Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
• Dynamic Kidney Exchange
• The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
• An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
• Fair Queuing and Other Probabilistic Allocation Methods

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