Markovian assignment rules
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Publication:2452135
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0566-XzbMATH Open1287.91099OpenAlexW2087221347MaRDI QIDQ2452135FDOQ2452135
Authors: Francis Bloch, David Cantala 
Publication date: 30 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0566-x
Recommendations
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
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Cited In (11)
- A dynamic school choice model
- Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
- Construction of rule-based assignment models
- Job rotation or specialization? A dynamic matching model analysis
- Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
- Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability
- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
- Influencing waiting lists
- A computational approach to the multi-period many-to-one matching with ties
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
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