Markovian assignment rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0566-XMaRDI QIDQ2452135zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francis Bloch, David Cantala

Publication date 30 May 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0566-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3145626 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3926712 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• An efficient dynamic mechanism
• Control aspects in proportionality Markov manpower systems
• Dynamic kidney exchange
• Fair Queuing and Other Probabilistic Allocation Methods
• Filling a multicolor urn: An axiomatic analysis.
• House allocation with existing tenants
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
• Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
• The dynamic pivot mechanism
• The theory and practice of revenue management
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• Welfare and stability in senior matching markets

Cited in

(11)

• A dynamic school choice model
• Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents
• Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
• Construction of rule-based assignment models
• Job rotation or specialization? A dynamic matching model analysis
• Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
• Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability
• The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
• Influencing waiting lists
• A computational approach to the multi-period many-to-one matching with ties
• On the operation of multiple matching markets

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