Influencing waiting lists
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Publication:2044982
Recommendations
- Efficiency and welfare implications of managed public sector hospital waiting lists
- Stochastic rationing by waiting list
- Equilibrium Allocations Under Alternative Waitlist Designs: Evidence From Deceased Donor Kidneys
- A Broader View of Designing the Liver Allocation System
- Optimal queue to minimize waste
Cites work
- A Proof for the Queuing Formula: L = λW
- A Stochastic Optimization Algorithm Minimizing Expected Flow Times on Uniforn Processors
- A dynamic school choice model
- Dynamic kidney exchange
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Individually optimal routing in parallel systems
- Markovian assignment rules
- Minimizing expected makespans on uniform processor systems
- Multiperiod matching
- Stability in dynamic matching markets
- The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
Cited in
(8)- Organ donation with vouchers
- Optimal queue to minimize waste
- Optimal provision-after-wait in healthcare
- Stochastic rationing by waiting list
- Matching through institutions
- Dynamically stable matching
- Dynamic matching with transfers
- Efficiency and welfare implications of managed public sector hospital waiting lists
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