Influencing waiting lists
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Publication:2044982
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105263zbMATH Open1470.90024OpenAlexW2188696652MaRDI QIDQ2044982FDOQ2044982
Authors: James Schummer
Publication date: 11 August 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105263
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Cites Work
- The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
- House allocation with existing tenants
- A Proof for the Queuing Formula: L = λW
- A dynamic school choice model
- Dynamic kidney exchange
- Markovian assignment rules
- Individually optimal routing in parallel systems
- A Stochastic Optimization Algorithm Minimizing Expected Flow Times on Uniforn Processors
- Stability in dynamic matching markets
- Minimizing expected makespans on uniform processor systems
- Multiperiod matching
Cited In (8)
- Organ donation with vouchers
- Optimal queue to minimize waste
- Optimal provision-after-wait in healthcare
- Stochastic rationing by waiting list
- Matching through institutions
- Dynamically stable matching
- Dynamic matching with transfers
- Efficiency and welfare implications of managed public sector hospital waiting lists
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