Organ donation with vouchers

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105159zbMath1458.91146OpenAlexW3101326189MaRDI QIDQ1995306

Jaehong Kim, Menghan Xu, Mengling Li

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105159

zbMATH Keywords

overlapping generationpublic goodpriority rulehealth economicsvoucherorgan donation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints

Cites Work

• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Recipient Choice Can Address the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off in Kidney Transplantation: A Mechanism Design Model
• Kidney Exchange
• Dynamic Kidney Exchange
• Fertility Choice in a Model of Economic Growth
• Optimal Auction Design
• Efficient Dynamic Barter Exchange
• Dual-Donor Organ Exchange
• Efficient and Incentive‐Compatible Liver Exchange
• The Elasticity of Intergenerational Substitution, Parental Altruism, and Fertility Choice
• Fairness, Efficiency, and Flexibility in Organ Allocation for Kidney Transplantation
• Pairwise Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier

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