Organ donation with vouchers
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Publication:1995306
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105159zbMATH Open1458.91146OpenAlexW3101326189MaRDI QIDQ1995306FDOQ1995306
Authors: Jaehong Kim, Mengling Li, M. H. Xu
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105159
Recommendations
- Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints
- Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule
- Influencing waiting lists
- Optimal control of a paired-kidney exchange program
- Fairness, efficiency, and flexibility in organ allocation for kidney transplantation
Cites Work
- Fertility Choice in a Model of Economic Growth
- Kidney Exchange
- Optimal Auction Design
- Fairness, efficiency, and flexibility in organ allocation for kidney transplantation
- Recipient choice can address the efficiency-equity trade-off in kidney transplantation: a mechanism design model
- Dynamic kidney exchange
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Pairwise Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier
- Dual-Donor Organ Exchange
- Efficient Dynamic Barter Exchange
- Efficient and Incentive‐Compatible Liver Exchange
- The Elasticity of Intergenerational Substitution, Parental Altruism, and Fertility Choice
Cited In (2)
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