Organ donation with vouchers

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105159MaRDI QIDQ1995306zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jaehong Kim, Mengling Li, M. H. Xu

Publication date 23 February 2021

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105159

zbMATH Keywords

priority rulepublic goodhealth economicsoverlapping generationvoucherorgan donation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints
• Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule
• Influencing waiting lists
• Optimal control of a paired-kidney exchange program
• Fairness, efficiency, and flexibility in organ allocation for kidney transplantation

Cites work

• Dual-donor organ exchange
• Dynamic kidney exchange
• Efficient and incentive-compatible liver exchange
• Efficient dynamic barter exchange
• Fairness, efficiency, and flexibility in organ allocation for kidney transplantation
• Fertility Choice in a Model of Economic Growth
• Kidney Exchange
• Optimal Auction Design
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Pairwise kidney exchange over the blood group barrier
• Recipient choice can address the efficiency-equity trade-off in kidney transplantation: a mechanism design model
• The elasticity of intergenerational substitution, parental altruism, and fertility choice

Cited in

(2)

• A self-contained karma economy for the dynamic allocation of common resources
• Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints

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