Organ donation with vouchers

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105159zbMATH Open1458.91146OpenAlexW3101326189MaRDI QIDQ1995306FDOQ1995306

Authors: Jaehong Kim, Mengling Li, M. H. Xu 

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105159

Recommendations

• Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints
• Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule
• Influencing waiting lists
• Optimal control of a paired-kidney exchange program
• Fairness, efficiency, and flexibility in organ allocation for kidney transplantation

zbMATH Keywords

priority rulepublic goodhealth economicsoverlapping generationvoucherorgan donation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Fertility Choice in a Model of Economic Growth
• Kidney Exchange
• Optimal Auction Design
• Fairness, efficiency, and flexibility in organ allocation for kidney transplantation
• Recipient choice can address the efficiency-equity trade-off in kidney transplantation: a mechanism design model
• Dynamic kidney exchange
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Pairwise Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier
• Dual-Donor Organ Exchange
• Efficient Dynamic Barter Exchange
• Efficient and Incentive‐Compatible Liver Exchange
• The Elasticity of Intergenerational Substitution, Parental Altruism, and Fertility Choice

Cited In (2)

• A self-contained karma economy for the dynamic allocation of common resources
• Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints

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