Matching through institutions
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Recommendations
Cites work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
- Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
- Influencing waiting lists
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
- Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings
- School Choice with Consent*
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Stable marriage with general preferences
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
- Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Stable Family and Threesome Roommates Problems
Cited in
(4)- Fair matching under constraints: theory and applications
- Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
- Online voluntary mentoring: optimising the assignment of students and mentors
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