Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
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Publication:1959723
DOI10.1007/s00453-009-9315-2zbMath1205.68257OpenAlexW1992351112MaRDI QIDQ1959723
Publication date: 7 October 2010
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-009-9315-2
computational complexitystable marriage problemcyclic preferencesthree-dimensional matchingKidney exchange
Combinatorics in computer science (68R05) Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)
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