Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
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Publication:5898285
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.005zbMath1141.91625arXivmath/0411028OpenAlexW2131227819MaRDI QIDQ5898285
Pontus Strimling, Jonas Sjöstrand, Kimmo Eriksson
Publication date: 7 December 2006
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0411028
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