Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences
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Publication:2060065
DOI10.1007/s10878-019-00501-2zbMath1482.90193OpenAlexW2991530735MaRDI QIDQ2060065
Publication date: 13 December 2021
Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-019-00501-2
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Cites Work
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