Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2060065
Recommendations
- Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners
- Three-sided stable matching problem with independent preferences
- Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences
- Reconsidering the existence of stable solutions in three-sided matching problems with mixed preferences
- A three-sided unidirectional acyclic stable matching with thresholds of preference order
Cites work
- Circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Group robust stability in matching markets
- Improved approximation algorithms for two variants of the stable marriage problem with ties
- Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
- Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners
- Sex-equal stable matchings: complexity and exact algorithms
- Stable matching with network externalities
- Stable matchings in three-sided systems with cyclic preferences
- The structure of stable marriage with indifference
- Three-Dimensional Stabl Matching Problems
- Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
- Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences
- Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners
- Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Stable Family and Threesome Roommates Problems
- ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- ``Sex-equal stable matchings
Cited in
(8)- Three-sided stable matching problem with independent preferences
- Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences
- Editorial: Special issue on matching under preferences
- Reconsidering the existence of stable solutions in three-sided matching problems with mixed preferences
- Three-sided matchings and separable preferences
- Three-sided unidirectional acyclic stable matchings based on probabilistic hesitant fuzzy information
- A three-sided unidirectional acyclic stable matching with thresholds of preference order
- On a many-sided matching problem with mixed preferences
This page was built for publication: Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2060065)
