Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples

DOI10.1007/s10878-009-9257-2zbMath1189.91102MaRDI QIDQ975759

Eric J. McDermid, David F. Manlove

Publication date: 11 June 2010

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/25729/1/25729.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

NP-completeness; polynomial-time algorithm; stable matching problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68Q25: Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity

91B68: Matching models

Related Items

Matching with sizes (or scheduling with processing set restrictions), Complexity of stability in trading networks, The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas, Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools, Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm, Improved algorithmic results for unsplittable stable allocation problems, Stable matchings of teachers to schools, Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems, Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search, The stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges, A note of reduced dimension optimization algorithm of assignment problem, A two-stage method for member selection of emergency medical service, Finding all stable matchings with couples, Equivalence of two-sided stable matching, ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples, Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences, Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchings, Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences, Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories, On the complexity of stable hypergraph matching, stable multicommodity flow and related problems, Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games, MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY

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