Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples

DOI10.1007/S10878-009-9257-2MaRDI QIDQ975759zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eric J. McDermid, David F. Manlove

Publication date 11 June 2010

Published in Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/25729/1/25729.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

NP-completenesspolynomial-time algorithmstable matching problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Matching models (91B68)

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• A unified approach to finding good stable matchings in the hospitals/residents setting
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
• NP-complete stable matching problems
• Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
• Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• Stable marriage with ties and bounded length preference lists
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Three Fast Algorithms for Four Problems in Stable Marriage

Cited in

(29)

• The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas
• Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
• Finding all stable matchings with couples
• A note of reduced dimension optimization algorithm of assignment problem
• Complexity of stability in trading networks
• Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences
• Equivalence of two-sided stable matching
• A Constraint Programming Approach to the Hospitals / Residents Problem
• Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences
• Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools
• Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm
• Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search
• A two-stage method for member selection of emergency medical service
• Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search
• Improved algorithmic results for unsplittable stable allocation problems
• Matching with sizes (or scheduling with processing set restrictions)
• Stable matchings of teachers to schools
• On the complexity of stable hypergraph matching, stable multicommodity flow and related problems
• An efficient implementation of the Gale and Shapley ``propose-and-reject algorithm
• Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
• Stable matching with couples: an empirical study
• Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games
• The stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges
• Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchings
• A unified approach to finding good stable matchings in the hospitals/residents setting
• Revisiting two-sided stability constraints
• Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
• ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples
• Socially stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem

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