Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples

DOI10.1007/S10878-009-9257-2zbMATH Open1189.91102OpenAlexW2054731762MaRDI QIDQ975759FDOQ975759

Authors: Eric J. McDermid, David F. Manlove 

Publication date: 11 June 2010

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/25729/1/25729.pdf

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1617265

zbMATH Keywords

NP-completenesspolynomial-time algorithmstable matching problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• NP-complete stable matching problems
• Three Fast Algorithms for Four Problems in Stable Marriage
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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
• Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
• Stable marriage with ties and bounded length preference lists
• Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
• A unified approach to finding good stable matchings in the hospitals/residents setting

Cited In (25)

• The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas
• Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
• Finding all stable matchings with couples
• A note of reduced dimension optimization algorithm of assignment problem
• Complexity of stability in trading networks
• Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences
• Equivalence of two-sided stable matching
• A Constraint Programming Approach to the Hospitals / Residents Problem
• Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences
• Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools
• Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm
• Matching with sizes (or scheduling with processing set restrictions)
• Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search
• Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search
• A two-stage method for member selection of emergency medical service
• Improved algorithmic results for unsplittable stable allocation problems
• Stable matchings of teachers to schools
• On the complexity of stable hypergraph matching, stable multicommodity flow and related problems
• Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
• Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games
• Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchings
• The stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges
• A unified approach to finding good stable matchings in the hospitals/residents setting
• Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
• ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples

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