Finding all stable matchings with couples
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Cites work
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Indexing methods for approximate dictionary searching, comparative analysis
- Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- Marriage, honesty, and stability
- Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm
- Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- NP-complete stable matching problems
- On a characterization of stable matchings
- School Choice with Consent*
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
- Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
Cited in
(6)- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Stable matchings with couples
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples
- Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints
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