Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
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Cites work
- Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
- Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and Complements
- Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Marriage, honesty, and stability
- NP-complete stable matching problems
- Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
- Stable matching with couples: an empirical study
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
- The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
Cited in
(34)- Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand
- Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets
- Emergence and dynamics of short food supply chains
- Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice
- Stability in matching markets with peer effects
- Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets
- Multilateral matching
- Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching
- Fair cake-cutting among families
- The losses from integration in matching markets can be large
- Stability in dynamic matching markets
- Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules
- School choice with neighbors
- Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
- Assignment problems with complementarities
- Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- Large matching markets as two-sided demand systems
- Technical note -- Assortment planning for two-sided sequential matching markets
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Market Design
- Stable matching in large economies
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
- Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores
- Matching markets with farsighted couples
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- Tiered random matching markets: rank is proportional to popularity
- Agreement toward stability in matching markets
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
- Finding all stable matchings with couples
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
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