Market Design
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Recommendations
- The optimal design of a market
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- Market microstructure
- Market selection
- Incentive compatible market design with applications
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Demand analysis using strategic reports: an application to a school choice mechanism
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- Dynamic kidney exchange
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- Efficient dynamic barter exchange
- Group stability in matching with interdependent values
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Kidney Exchange
- Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
- On cores and indivisibility
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- School Choice with Consent*
- School choice: an experimental study
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Stability with one-sided incomplete information
- Stable matching with incomplete information
- The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
- Two-sided matching with interdependent values
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(13)- Matching markets with mixed ownership: the case for a real-life assignment mechanism
- Technical note -- Assortment planning for two-sided sequential matching markets
- Market problems
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- Multiperiod matching
- Opting into optimal matchings
- The optimal design of a market
- Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: an experimental study
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Mechanism design in school choice: some lessons in a nutshell
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Matching under preferences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 16101 (Why is no real title available?)
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