Stability with one-sided incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.01.004zbMATH Open1400.91367OpenAlexW2572854778MaRDI QIDQ508409FDOQ508409

Sushil Bikhchandani

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/44w255g8

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zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationstable matchingincomplete-information core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian inference (62F15) Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
• On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• Incomplete information, credibility and the core
• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences

Cited In (11)

• Market Design
• Bayesian stable states
• Not all is lost: sorting and self-stabilizing sets
• Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• School choice with costly information acquisition
• Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information
• Tailored recommendations on a matching platform
• On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information
• Decision-making with reference information
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences

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