Not all is lost: sorting and self-stabilizing sets

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.04.008zbMATH Open1546.91179MaRDI QIDQ6584584FDOQ6584584

Authors: Esteban Peralta 

Publication date: 8 August 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationsortingstable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Matching markets under (in)complete information
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information
• Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
• Learning by matching
• On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information

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