Not all is lost: sorting and self-stabilizing sets

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.04.008MaRDI QIDQ6584584zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Esteban Peralta

Publication date 8 August 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationsortingstable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Assortative Matching and Search
• Assortative matching and risk sharing
• Monotonic matching in search equilibrium
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• The revealed preference theory of stable and extremal stable matchings

Cites work

• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
• Learning by matching
• Matching markets under (in)complete information
• On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information
• Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values

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