Not all is lost: sorting and self-stabilizing sets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6584584
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.04.008zbMATH Open1546.91179MaRDI QIDQ6584584FDOQ6584584
Publication date: 8 August 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Matching markets under (in)complete information
- Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
- Two-sided matching with interdependent values
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Stability with one-sided incomplete information
- Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
- Learning by matching
- On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information
This page was built for publication: Not all is lost: sorting and self-stabilizing sets
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6584584)