Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
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Cites work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- On randomized matching mechanisms
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries
- Random matching in the college admissions problem
- Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
- Stable matching with incomplete information
- Stochastic stability for roommate markets
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Two-sided matching with interdependent values
Cited in
(9)- Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
- Not all is lost: sorting and self-stabilizing sets
- Stable matching with uncertain linear preferences
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem
- Learning by matching
- On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information
- Commitment under uncertainty: Two-stage stochastic matching problems
- Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets
- Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets
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