Random matching in the college admissions problem
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Publication:2472434
DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0191-6zbMath1134.91517OpenAlexW2133115749MaRDI QIDQ2472434
Publication date: 22 February 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2630
Related Items (11)
Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents ⋮ Constrained school choice ⋮ An analysis of the German university admissions system ⋮ The aviation technology two-sided matching with the expected time based on the probabilistic linguistic preference relations ⋮ Matching markets under (in)complete information ⋮ Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress ⋮ A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' ⋮ Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty ⋮ Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems ⋮ Incentives in decentralized random matching markets ⋮ A matching method for second-hand goods exchange considering loss aversion of buyer and seller in e-brokerage
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- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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