Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.06.001MaRDI QIDQ6637002zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Sulagna Dasgupta

Publication date 12 November 2024

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.06.001

zbMATH Keywords

deferred acceptanceinformation designmatchingobject allocationserial dictatorshipsocial welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers
• Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship
• Matching markets under (in)complete information
• Truthtelling in matching markets

Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099363 (Why is no real title available?)
• Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
• Pivotal persuasion
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values

Cited in

(2)

• A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching
• Tailored recommendations on a matching platform

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