Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship
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Cites work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Learning matters: reappraising object allocation rules when agents strategically investigate
- Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Recommender systems as mechanisms for social learning
- Sequential Information Design
- Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Whether or not to open Pandora's box
Cited in
(7)- Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
- Equilibrium selection and the role of information in repeated matching markets
- Strategic experimentation with asymmetric players
- Strategic Experimentation
- Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
- Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets
- Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets
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